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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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are part of that oppression—it must blunt our faith and sap the strength of our high purpose.

Thus this is a victory for the freedom of the American Negro. But it is also a victory for the freedom of the American Nation. And every family, across this entire searching land, will live stronger in liberty, more splendid in expectation, and will be prouder to be American because of the act I will sign today. [Prolonged applause.]

At 12 o'clock and 28 minutes p.m., the President and Vice President of the United States, followed by Members of the Senate and House of Representatives and distinguished guests who had been invited to witness the ceremony, proceeded to the President's Room, where the President signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

*DR Clark*  
WH

## THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting an inquiry in executive session on the armed intervention of American troops into the Dominican Republic.

One of the most controversial questions are the extent of Communist infiltration in Latin America generally and the Dominican Republic in particular. Another is what damage, if any, has the intervention done to the standing of the United States throughout Latin America.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD three articles dealing with these questions.

The first is an article in the Atlantic Monthly, written before our troops moved in, entitled "The Decline of Communism in Latin America."

The second is a column by Marquis Childs which appeared in a recent issue of the Washington Post entitled "Reluctant Allies in the Hemisphere."

The third is an article by Juan Bosch former President of the Dominican Republic entitled "Communism and Democracy in the Dominican Republic" which appeared in the Saturday Review of August 7.

I believe these three articles present a point of view which should be seriously considered by the Senate.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Atlantic Monthly]

## THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

(By Ernst Halperin)

(NOTE.—Ernst Halperin, a research associate at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has spent 2 years in Latin America studying communism and has arrived at some surprising conclusions about its prospects below the border. Currently living in Rio de Janeiro, he has written for newspapers and many major periodicals and is the author of "The Triumphant Heretic," a book about Tito.)

The contrast of opulence and poverty in Latin America is so striking that visitors frequently assume the region to be on the verge of a social cataclysm. In the big cities, the elegant residential districts and the downtown business sections with their sky-

scrapers are ringed with shantytown areas—vast agglomerations of shacks that would make any European slum dwelling look palatial.

The streets in the shantytowns are unpaved. There are no water pipes or drains. The shacks of wood and cardboard are infested by vermin. One would think that their miserable, underfed inhabitants would be kept in a constant paroxysm of envy and class hatred by the sight of the villas, the automobiles, the office buildings gleaming with chromium and plate glass, the luxury goods displayed in the windows of air-conditioned shops. Yet although there have been occasional outbursts of violence in Bogotá, Santiago, and other cities, the shantytowns are not the hotbeds of revolution which the foreign observer assumes them to be.

Truth is, there are many factors working against the possibility of a dominant Communist influence in the affairs of Latin America. One is the emergence of a highly nationalistic middle class more disposed to exploiting Communist assistance than to adherence to Communist discipline. Another is the absence of revolutionary zeal among the urban working classes. Though the prospects in store for U.S. interests in Latin America may well be harsh, the chances of a Communist-dominated regime are slim indeed. There are many trends and incidents to substantiate this conclusion.

In the Peruvian presidential election of 1963, for example, the shantytown districts of Lima, which are among the worst in Latin America, favored Gen. Manuel Odria, the most conservative of the four presidential candidates. In the Venezuelan presidential election later that year, Arturo Uslar Pietri, a conservative intellectual and representative of business interests, polled a majority of the shantytown vote in Caracas. In the Chilean presidential election of 1964, the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei prevailed over the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende, in the shantytowns of Santiago and Valparaíso.

Latin-American Marxists attribute the failure of their propaganda in the shantytowns to lack of political consciousness, but the real reason would appear to be a different one. Most shantytown dwellers come from depressed rural areas, and city life offers them certain advantages not easily perceived by the foreign visitor who is appalled by the squalor of the shantytown. There are health centers and other social services, and occupational and educational opportunities are far better than in the stagnant rural areas. There is also the prospect of one day moving out to an inexpensive apartment in a government housing project. Many Latin-American countries are building government housing on a vast scale, although unfortunately even the most ambitious housing programs barely manage to keep pace with the movement of people from the rural areas to the cities.

Only the most energetic of the shantytown dwellers manage to take full advantage of these opportunities, but these are exactly the people who form the opinions and determine the spirit of the whole community. They are realists on the lookout for material improvement, and in politics they tend to support the man who is in a position to provide such improvement, even if he is a dictator or a politician with an unsavory record.

Shantytown dwellers may occasionally vote for a Marxist politician, but they are not attracted by Marxist ideology. Marxism holds that the capitalist system inevitably produces the pauperization of the toiling masses; that at best it may permit a temporary alleviation of their suffering but never a substantial, permanent improvement of their condition; that this system is doomed to disappear in a catastrophe; that it is the

historic mission of the working class to overthrow capitalism by a revolution; and that this task must be carried out through the collective action of the working class organized as a revolutionary political party.

This doctrine does not tally either with the aspirations or with the experience of the leaders of shantytown opinion. Their condition is already better than it was when they arrived from the countryside, and they cannot be made to believe that revolution is necessary to achieve the further material improvements they desire.

## THE LABOR ARISTOCRACY

Besides the shantytown population of unskilled laborers who have drifted in from the rural areas, the urban working class of Latin America contains a second element: a highly organized and exclusive labor aristocracy composed of groups such as dockers, railroad men, and other transportation workers, and the skilled labor employed by industry and the trades. Through political influence and the militancy of their unions, these groups have attained a wage level that in many cases compares favorably with that of European, if not of North American workers.

In some Latin American countries, the Communists appear to have established a measure of control over the labor aristocracy, whose trade unions they have infiltrated. However, this does not mean that they have truly won the allegiance of the workers, let alone converted them to Marxism. In times of crisis, when the government moves to suppress and persecute the party, the workers invariably fail to come out in defense of the Communists. The Latin American urban working class is clearly not a revolutionary element. Furthermore, it lacks the pre-Marxist tradition of militant socialism and anarchism that causes French and Italian workers to remain faithful to the party in spite of material improvement.

As early as the 1920s, a brilliant Peruvian intellectual, J. C. Mariategui, advised the Communist parties to shift their efforts from the urban workers to the Indian peasants of the Andean highlands, and to base their propaganda on a nationalism emphasizing the native Indian element of Latin American culture. Mariategui's proposal was not accepted by the Communist International, and to this day, Latin American Communist parties, in the face of constant disappointments, stubbornly cling to the Leninist formula of the decisive revolutionary role of the urban proletariat.

In accordance with the precepts of Leninism, Communist Party pronouncements invariably stress the importance of "a firm alliance of the workers with the peasants." This is usually empty talk, since most Latin American Communist parties lack the cadres which the arduous and dangerous work of proselytizing in the villages would require. The Communists of some Central American republics at one time exerted considerable influence over the workers of the big industrialized plantations, but they lost it after a series of unsuccessful strikes. There are one or two pockets of Communist Party influence in the mountain valleys of Colombia. The Chilean Communists—the only Latin American Communist Party with a substantial corps of trained propagandists—has recently made headway among agricultural workers and tenants on the big estates. With these and a few other minor exceptions, the Communist parties of Latin America are an urban phenomenon.

Nearly all these parties are very small, consisting of a number of intellectuals of the type known as drawing-room Communists, some trade union leaders with their personal retinue, and a sizable but undisciplined student and youth group. Apart from Cuba, where recruitment to the party ranks is promoted by the government, the only

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notable exception to this pattern is Chile. There the industrial workers, particularly those in the copper, nitrate, and coal mines, have a tradition of militant unionism and political activity dating back to the first years of the century, and this has worked to the advantage of the Communists. The Chilean Communist Party is the only one in Latin America which has a sound working-class base.

The doctrine of the decisive revolutionary role of the urban proletariat has had a surprising effect on the policies of the Latin American Communist parties: it has rendered them highly opportunistic. The difficult task of proselytizing among a social group antipathetic to Communist ideology can only be carried on where party members enjoy some freedom to operate. Latin American Communists therefore, reluctant to undergo the risk of total suppression, have frequently come to terms with a dictator, agreeing to confine themselves to a purely verbal opposition and to decline cooperation with the democratic opposition groups.

## TOLERANCE TOWARD SUBVERSIVES

In Latin America, public opinion does not regard subversion with the same abhorrence as it does in Europe or the United States. The most respectable Latin American democratic parties of the center and right have more conspiracies, uprisings, coups, and pronunciamientos on record than the Communists have. The current Communist guerrilla campaign in Venezuela is a departure from the usual pattern of Communist Party activities in Latin America. There has been only one earlier attempt to seize power by force in the entire history of the Communist movement in Latin America: the Brazilian uprising of 1935. This was an army coup in the classical Latin American manner; it failed because the expected civilian support did not materialize. The leader of the coup, Luis Carlos Prestes, had been an army officer and a celebrated guerrilla leader before he had joined the Communists. He has since become one of the most consistent and determined advocates of peaceful methods among the leaders of Latin American communism.

The Communists' very lack of success has made it possible for non-Communist political groups to accept them as allies. Most Latin American politicians do not regard their local Communist Party as a serious threat, while the Communists' small but tightly knit party organization, their ability to mobilize students for demonstrations, and their influence in the trade unions can make their collaboration useful to dictators and democrats alike.

The easygoing attitude of non-Communist and even strongly anti-Communist Latin American politicians toward the party is the despair of European and North American observers, but their warnings are usually disregarded because they are not borne out by practical experience. In Latin America it is simply not true that anyone who has dealings with the Communists becomes their prisoner. Democratic politicians such as Gonzalez Videla of Chile and caudillos such as Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador welcomed Communist support in their struggle for power; and later, when the Communists ceased to be useful, these politicians had no difficulty in casting them off. The latest case in point is that of Fidel Castro.

When Castro began to favor the Cuban Communists, and even entrusted them with the task of organizing his own ruling party, most foreign observers assumed he would soon be reduced to the condition of a mere puppet in the hands of the Old Guard Communist leaders. Yet today, Castro is in undisputed command of the party which the Old Guard Communists had helped him to build, and the old party leaders are either pushed aside or relegated to positions of sec-

ondary importance. This rank outsider, who has no Communist Party training and has never been subjected to party discipline, has even forced the Russians to accept the situation and to admit him into the councils of world communism—a telling symptom of the state of confusion and disintegration in which the Communist movement has been plunged since the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

## MIDDLE-CLASS NATIONALISTS

One of the most widespread of the many misconceptions about Latin America is that its political troubles are due to the absence of a strong middle class. Democracy is said to be the way of life of the middle class; therefore, it is argued, there would be a functioning, healthy democracy in Latin America if it had a middle class capable of asserting itself.

But this concept of Latin American society as a rigid structure composed of the very rich and the very poor is taken from the descriptions of 10th-century travelers. Today it applies only to the backward rural areas. For the last half century, the cities of Latin America have been the scene of great social change and economic development. Photographs of the downtown areas of cities such as Jaracas, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Santiago de Chile that were taken 15 years ago are hardly recognizable today.

Social mobility in Latin America is greater, not less, than in Europe. The amazing economic success of immigrants from European countries, as well as from the Near and Far East, testifies to this. At the same time, the cities of Latin America have witnessed the emergence and rapid growth of an ambitious, politically conscious, and highly assertive native middle class. The political weight and influence of this urban middle class is all the greater because the bulk of Latin America's rural population is politically passive and inarticulate.

In the more important Latin-American countries, political power long ago passed from the hands of the aristocracy into those of middle-class politicians, or of army officers, who are also usually of middle-class origin. These politicians and military men may not represent the collective will or the interests of their class, as the Marxists would have it, but their policies certainly reflect the attitudes prevalent among people of their middle-class background: specifically, a vigorous nationalism.

Inevitably, this middle-class nationalism expresses itself in resentment against whatever foreign power occupies a dominant position in the economy of the hemisphere. Before World War II, when British capital still held important positions in the economy of some Latin-American countries, their nationalism was anti-British as much as or even more than anti-American. Through the war, the United States came into a position of undisputed economic and political hegemony over the entire hemisphere, and in consequence, Latin-American nationalism is now directed almost entirely against the United States.

## BLIND HATRED OF THE UNITED STATES

There are, however, varying degrees of nationalism. The leaders of the middle-class parties now in power in a number of Latin-American states are fervent nationalists, some of them with an anti-American record, but they are also responsible statesmen and realists. They recognize, that in view of its overwhelming economic and military strength, the United States must inevitably play a leading role in the hemisphere. They also realize that their countries can reap substantial benefit from association with a power of such magnitude. They are willing to accept partnership—but not blind subservience in their foreign policy, or subordination of their domestic policies to the requirements of American business interests.

Such is the attitude, for example, of the Mexican and Venezuelan Governments, and of President Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru and President Frei of Chile.

But there are also more extreme nationalists, who regard any arrangement with the United States as treason. Extreme nationalism is not a mass movement in any Latin-American country, with the possible exception of Cuba, where it is fanned by extensive Government propaganda. It is rarely to be found among workers, least of all among those employed by American-owned companies, which usually pay higher wages and provide more social services than any local capitalist does. In most Latin-American countries, extreme nationalism and virulent anti-Americanism are prevalent in certain restricted sectors of the political and intellectual elite: among university and high school students and teachers, lawyers, journalists, writers, and artists. Since the ruling political parties often recruit their leading cadres precisely from these groups, the absence of a mass following does not render extreme nationalism either impotent or innocuous.

Roberto Campos, the Brazilian Minister of Planning and former Ambassador to the United States, recently wrote of the extreme nationalists of his own country that in many respects their "false Brazilian nationalism boils down to hatred of the United States, as if Brazil's true interest were in direct mathematical proportion to the harm we could cause to the great country in the north." This blind hatred, as Campos rightly calls it, is aroused by the mere fact of U.S. political and economic hegemony in Latin America, and not by any particular aspect of U.S. policy. The extreme nationalists object to any and every policy implemented by the United States. Even when the U.S. Government gave financial support to the Bolivian revolutionary government, which had nationalized the tin mines and carried out the most drastic agrarian reform in the history of the continent, the extreme nationalists only complained that the Bolivians had sold out to the United States.

The aim of the extreme nationalists is nothing less than the destruction of U.S. power in Latin America. Since no combination of Latin-American countries is strong enough to achieve this, the extreme nationalists seek an outside ally—a world power capable of inflicting a military defeat on the United States.

Before and during World War II, Latin-American extreme nationalism sought alliance with Germany and Italy. After the war, its interest was aroused by the new great power which had emerged to challenge the United States in Europe and Asia, the Soviet Union. Extreme nationalism now swung left: It established contact with the Soviet Union's unofficial Latin-American agents, the Communist Parties. The first fruit of their cooperation was the establishment of a coalition government of nationalists and Communists in the Central American republic of Guatemala.

When the Guatemalan Government was overthrown by a CIA-sponsored uprising in 1954, indignation swept Latin America. Moderate nationalists like Eduardo Frei of Chile joined the extremists in condemning U.S. interference in the internal affairs of a Latin-American country.

The Guatemalan affair demonstrated that the time was not yet ripe for the establishment of a Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere. Three years later, a revolutionary innovation in military technology completely changed the situation: the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile freed Soviet military power from its restriction to the Eurasian land mass. This at last put Latin America within the range of Soviet aspirations. As early as the spring of 1959, the Soviet Union established contact with

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Fidel Castro, offering him material support against the United States. Soviet aid began pouring in, and in 1960 the Soviet Government uttered its first, rather cautiously worded threat of nuclear retaliation in the event of an attack on Cuba.

## CUBA, A TEST CASE

There is some evidence of Russian hesitation and doubt about the wisdom of the Cuban venture. Nevertheless, Russia's appearance on the Latin-American scene had an electrifying effect on the extreme nationalists; Cuba seemed to them to be the test case which demonstrated the Soviet Union's ability and readiness to support them in an out-and-out struggle against the United States. They had hitherto been skeptical of the Soviet Union, and in 1956 many of them had condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary. This critical attitude was now supplanted by one of adulation.

There was something utterly artificial about this enthusiasm; it was not accompanied by any genuine desire to observe current events in the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. Such fascinating developments as destalinization, the rewriting of party history, the rehabilitation of many of Stalin's victims, the new trends in Soviet art and literature, the strains in Soviet relations with the satellites did not arouse the interest of these new admirers of the Soviet Union. Although they could not help taking note of the Sino-Soviet conflict, they failed to recognize its significance, its relevance to Soviet foreign policy, and its effect on the power and cohesion of the bloc. Their lack of discernment was unwise but understandable. To them, the Soviet Union was a military ally, and the real subject of their interest was Soviet nuclear and conventional military capacity.

In the years 1960-63, numerous extreme nationalists announced their loyalty to the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. There was a very superficial Marxism-Leninism; it amounted to little more than acceptance of Marx's definition of capitalism as exploitation of man by man, and of Lenin's formula that imperialism was the last stage of capitalism. There was no serious study of the subject, no interest in current developments.

The unsophisticated observer nevertheless found it impossible to distinguish the extreme nationalists from party line Communists. And they were indeed Communists in the sense that they professed belief in Marxism-Leninism, supported Soviet foreign policy, admired the Soviet economic system, and strove to impose a similar system in their own country. But they were not Communists if that term is understood to imply subjection to Communist Party discipline and readiness to implement the policies of the International Communist movement.

The distinction may appear to be mere hairsplitting, yet it is of vital importance to an understanding of the politics of the Latin American extreme left. Party line Communists are trained to follow Soviet instructions to the letter, to retreat on order as well as to attack. The extreme nationalists, who call themselves Marxist-Leninists, cannot be relied upon to do so. To them, the Soviet Union is not a leader to whom they owe unconditional allegiance but merely an ally, and even this only so long as Soviet policy is to their liking—that is, one of unrelenting and unceasing hostility to the United States. Fidel Castro is an example of this independence of mind; although completely dependent on Soviet economic and military aid, he has often openly—and sometimes dramatically, as in his refusal to sign the test ban treaty—registered disagreement with any softening of the Soviet attitude toward the United States.

## REVOLUTION THROUGH TERROR

Castro's revolutionary strategy for Latin America is diametrically opposed to the

strategy of the Communist parties. As expounded in Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare, its three basic principles are that guerrilla bands can defeat a regular army; that by its activities, a guerrilla nucleus can create a revolutionary situation where it is not already in existence; and that the peasants and not the urban workers are the main revolutionary force in underdeveloped Latin America.

A major effort to implement this strategy was made in Venezuela, where nationalist groups were joined by a Communist Party which had seceded from the Soviet fold. In December 1963, after a year of guerrilla fighting, sabotage, and terrorism, the Venezuelan people expressed rejection of Castroism and communism by widespread participation in a presidential election which the leftists had first attempted to prevent and then to boycott. Minor attempts to launch guerrilla campaigns in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina were either nipped in the bud or crushed at an early stage, leaving only scattered guerrilla bands in the mountains.

The Cuban strategy of revolution through guerrilla warfare has thus proved ineffective in countries where conditions are less favorable than they were in Batista's Cuba. Most Latin American governments have greater popular support than that of Batista. The armies of such countries as Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru are efficient and have a long fighting tradition; they cannot be as easily demoralized by guerrillas as Batista's inglorious army. And finally, Castroite doctrine probably overestimates the revolutionary potential of the Latin American peasantry, for the elements of this group most likely to rebel are constantly being drawn off to the cities.

The Cuban strategy of guerrilla warfare is attractive to nationalistic youth. The older generation of extreme nationalists know that there are more effective ways of winning political power. They are members of the political elite; among them are influential politicians and even top-ranking army officers. There is, therefore, always the possibility of extreme nationalism coming to power in some Latin American country through a coup or even by constitutional means. Such was the case in Brazil, where an extreme nationalist, Vice President João Goulart, acceded to the presidency in a perfectly constitutional manner after the voluntary resignation of his predecessor, President Janio Quadros. Goulart was a man of vacillating charter, incapable of steering a definite course, but his extremist friends were pushing him toward a revolution of the Cuban type when in March 1964, he was deposed by an army coup.

At that time the wave of extreme nationalism and communism that had swept Latin America was ebbing. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had been the turning point. The withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and aircraft showed the Latin American extreme nationalists that their entire policy had been based on a miscalculation—an overoptimistic assessment of Soviet possibilities and Soviet intentions. The Soviet Union was not, after all, willing to risk war in order to back a Latin American revolution. It had only pushed onward as long as the United States permitted it to do so, and had beaten a hasty retreat as soon as the United States showed its strength.

## THE SWING TOWARD CHINA

One of the effects of the missile crisis has been to awaken the Latin American extreme nationalists' interest in the Sino-Soviet conflict and to swing their sympathies to the Chinese side. Before the missile crisis, they had regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as irrelevant to the Latin American situation, and Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign policy as unjustified. The Chinese accuse the Soviets of planning to betray the cause of

revolution by coming to terms with the United States. This certainly did not seem to apply to the Western Hemisphere, where the Soviet Union was challenging the United States by its support of Cuba. But after the missile crisis fiasco, these accusations appeared to gain in substance.

At the time of the missile crisis, the Communist Party of Venezuela changed over to the strategy of guerrilla warfare. At the same time, it ceased to support the Russians against the Chinese.

In Brazil, a sizable faction broke away from the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party to form a rival Communist Party of Brazil apparently subsidized by the Chinese. A similar split took place in Peru, while minor secessions occurred in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. Too much importance should not, however, be attached to these events. The Latin American Communist Parties are small and ineffectual; internal dissensions will hardly lead to anything but a further decline.

As for the nationalists, their sympathies for China are likely to remain platonic; they are primarily interested in military strength, not in ideology, and China is not yet nearly strong enough to assert its interests in Latin America through the force of arms.

After the Venezuelan presidential election of December 1963, and the Brazilian coup of March 1964, the extreme left suffered a third blow in the spectacular defeat of the Marxist Salvador Allende by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei in the Chilean presidential election of September 1964, and Frei's subsequent victory in the parliamentary elections this March. On all these occasions, the weakness displayed by the leftists was undoubtedly an effect of the missile crisis, which had robbed them of their hope of defeating the United States through alliance with the Soviet Union. The following lesson may be drawn from this.

Economic aid alone is not enough; it must be supplemented by an effective American foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress is the proper way to win the friendship of the moderate nationalists, who today constitute the most important political force in the area, but it cannot disarm the extreme nationalists, who will only continue to denounce it as one more maneuver to perpetuate U.S. domination.

In themselves, these extreme nationalists may be troublesome to American business interests, but they do not represent a threat to the security of the United States. They become dangerous only through their alliance with the Soviet Union. The aim of American foreign policy in the area must therefore be to persuade the Soviet leaders that Latin America is not within their reach. This cannot be done by inflicting punishment on Central American army colonels, Caribbean adventurers, and other exponents of extreme nationalism while avoiding direct confrontation with the real adversary.

The American policy of harassing the recipients of Soviet arms has not been effective in Latin America or anywhere else. The only effective policy is that of standing up to the donor, to the Soviet Union itself. That was done in the Cuban missile crisis, and the result has been a very marked decline of anti-American extreme nationalism and communism in the area.

[From the Washington Post]

RELUCTANT ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE  
(By Marquis Childs)

SANTIAGO, CHILE.—The U.S. State Department line, observed with a letter-of-the-law faithfulness, is that the crisis in the Dominican Republic has made no real difference in the standing of the United States in Latin America. Machinegun slugs fired into a few embassies, bomb threats, yes; but, the visitor is told, no big demonstrations.

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This is, of course, literally true. Yet it seems to one observer to be a form of self-disquiet and not only in Government circles but, according to those with contacts at lower levels, among the people themselves. The landing of the marines was taken as a return to the use of naked power by an America bent on exercising control where control in the national interest is judged essential.

One of the first casualties was the Inter-American Foreign Ministers Conference, originally scheduled for May and then postponed to August 4. Now it has been postponed again, presumably to a date to be set prior to the end of the year. The Conference has been an important prestige symbol for Brazil, since it was to be held in Rio de Janeiro on the 400th anniversary of that city's founding. Moreover, it would have been a plus for the hard-pressed government of President Humberto Castelo Branco.

Five countries voted against postponing the Conference, Chile being one of the minority in opposition to the 14 nations, including the United States, that voted for delay. The Chileans had a number of things they wanted to say at the earliest opportunity about the weakness of the Inter-American system and the meaning of the Dominican crisis in this connection. Postponement was interpreted as a confession that in view of the vastness of the problems confronting the hemisphere, with the Dominican mess still unresolved, it was better not to meet at all rather than to have a session that would be likely to descend to acrimony and vituperation.

Washington's goal was the creation of an inter-American permanent peace force ready to intervene to repel outside aggression. But aside from a half dozen states in the client or semiclient relationship with the United States, this concept has little support.

Now the cloud of American involvement in a full-scale war in Vietnam darkens the horizon. The World War of 25 years ago began against a wholly different background. The good-neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt, pursued with such zeal by his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had created an atmosphere of good will and cooperation. Most Latinos wanted to believe that this was the future order for the hemisphere.

But another and perhaps more important difference set that time apart. The leftist leaning and even the center parties were opposed to nazism and fascism. When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941 and Pearl Harbor followed 6 months later, Washington and Moscow were allies.

The present crisis confronting the United States comes after 20 years of hostile Communist and leftist propaganda that has been intensified in recent months. In a constant drumfire through a wide variety of channels, radio in particular, the United States is pictured as an imperialist power bent on subjugating a small nation in southeast Asia. It is in this context, distorted and false as it is, that the Dominican intervention must be put.

Another factor in the atmosphere of 1940 as contrasted to the present day was President Roosevelt's refusal in 1938 to intervene with force when Mexico nationalized the oil properties of American companies with compensation provided by the Mexican Government. It made a deep impression throughout the continent that despite powerful political pressures, F.D.R. declined to act.

Today the Hickenlooper amendment, automatically suspending aid to any country that nationalizes, hangs over the heads of government leaders faced with mounting demands from all sides. Foreign ownership of utilities and basic commodities such as oil is bound to become a hotter issue throughout the continent.

These, in the view of one observer, are today's realities. They will be ignored at the risk of serious miscalculation in assessing the future of the relation between Washington and the rest of the hemisphere. America's power is overwhelming. That is a most important reason for the comparative quiescence with which the Dominican intervention was accepted. But this power does not necessarily mean loyalty, a willing allegiance, when the chips are down.

[From the Saturday Review, Aug. 7, 1965]  
COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Note.—Juan Bosch is the first man in the history of the Dominican Republic to have become its President through a free election. He won his overwhelming—and surprising victory in December 1962. But in September 1963, he was overthrown by the military. In April of this year, pro-Bosch forces revolted against the government of Donald Reid, leading to the present crisis. This article appears in Saturday Review through special arrangement with War/Peace Report in which Mr. Bosch's article is also carried this week.)

(By Juan Bosch)

SIN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.—After the U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo, the Department of State first released a list of 53 Dominican Communists; then a list of 58; and finally, a list of 77.

When I was President of the Dominican Republic, I calculated that in Santo Domingo there were between 700 and 800 Communists, and I estimated the number of Communist sympathizers at between 3,000 and 3,500. These 700 or 800 Communists were divided into three groups, of which, in my judgment, the largest was the Popular Dominican Movement, with perhaps between 400 and 500 members in the entire country; next came the Popular Socialist Party with somewhat less, around 300 to 400; and then, in a number that in my opinion did not reach 50, the Communists had infiltrated the June 14th Movement, some of them in executive posts and others at lower levels.

I ought to make clear that in 1963 in the Dominican Republic there was much political confusion, and a large number of people, especially middle-class youth, did not know for certain what they were and what they wanted to be, whether democrats or Communists. But that has happened in almost all countries where there have been prolonged dictatorships, once the dictatorships pass. After a certain time has elapsed and the political panorama becomes clarified, many people who began their public life as Communists pass into the democratic camp. In 1963 the Dominican Republic needed time for the democratic system to clear up the confusion, and in a sense the time was used that way, since 700 or 800 Communists, divided in three groups, with sympathizers numbering between 3,000 and 3,500, could in no case—not even with arms in their hands—take power or even represent a serious threat.

If there weren't enough Communists to take power, there was, on the other hand, a strong sentiment against persecution of the Communists. This feeling developed because during his long tyranny Trujillo always accused his adversaries of being Communists. Because of that, anticomunism, and Trujillism ended up being equivalent terms in the Dominican political vocabulary. Moreover, the instruments of oppression—the police and the armed forces—remained the same in 1963—with the same men who had served under Trujillo. If I had used them against the Communists I would have ended up as their prisoner, and they, for their part, would have completely destroyed the Dominican democratic forces. For those men, having learned from Trujillo, there was no dis-

tinguishment between democrats and Communists; anyone who opposed any of their violence, or even their corruption, was a Communist and ought to be annihilated.

My presumption was correct, as events have shown. From the dawn of September 25, the day of the coup d'état against the government I headed, the police began to persecute and beat without mercy all the non-Communist democrats who in the opinion of the military chiefs would be able to resist the coup. It was known that in all the country not one Communist had infiltrated my party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), but still the leaders and members of that party were persecuted as Communists. The chief of police himself insulted the prisoners by calling them Communists. Many leaders of the PRD were deported, and—a curious fact—numerous Communists who had been in Europe, Russia, and Cuba were permitted to return. But the leaders of the PRD were not permitted to return, and if one did he was immediately deported again. During the 19 months of the government of Donald Reid, thousands of democrats from the PRD and hundreds from the Social Christian Party and the June 14 movement were jailed, deported and beaten in a barbaric manner; the headquarters of these three parties were assaulted or destroyed by the police. All the vehicles, desks, typewriters and other valuable effects of the PRD were robbed by the police. In the months of May and June 1964, more than 1,000 members of the PRD who had been accused of being Communists were in jail at one time.

That anti-Communist fury launched against the democratic Dominicans was an important factor in the eruption of the April revolution because the people were fighting to regain their right to live under a legal order, not a police state. If it had been I who unleashed that fury, the revolution would have been against the democratic regime, not in favor of democracy.

It was not necessary to be a political genius to realize that if anti-Communist persecution began in the Dominican Republic, the police and the military would also persecute the democrats. Neither need one be a political genius to understand that what the country needed was not stimulation of the mad forces of Trujillism which still existed in the police and the military, but rather the strengthening of democracy by demonstrating to the Dominicans in practice that what was best for them and the country was to live under the legal order of a democratic regime.

Now then, in the Dominican picture there was a force that in my opinion was determining the pointer of the political balance, in terms of ideologies and doctrines, and that force was the June 14 movement.

I have said that according to my calculations there was in the June 14th Movement an infiltration of less than 50 Communists, some of them in executive positions and others at lower levels. But I must state that control of this party, at all levels, was held by an overwhelming majority of young people who were not Communists and some of whom were strongly anti-Communist. How can one explain that there should be Communists together with non-Communists and active anti-Communists? There is one reason: the June 14th Movement was based, in all its breadth and at all its levels, on intense nationalism, and that nationalism was manifested above all in terms of strong anti-Americanism. To convert that anti-norteamericanismo into dominicanismo there was only one way: maintain for a long time a democratic regime with a dynamic and creative sense.

I knew that if the country saw the establishment of a government that was not elected by the people—that was not constitutional and not respectful of civil liberties—

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the Communists would attribute this new government to U.S. maneuvers. I also knew that in view of the anti-Americanism of the youth of the middle class—especially in the June 14th Movement—Communist influence would increase. The equilibrium of the political balance was, then, in that party. Any sensible Dominican politician realized that. The trouble was that in 1963 the Dominican Republic did not have sensible politicians, or at least not enough of them. The appetites for power held in check for a third of a century overflowed, and the politicians turned to conspiring with Trujillo's military men. The immediate result was the coup of September 1963; the delayed result was the revolution of April 1965.

It is easy to understand why Dominican youth of the middle class was so nationalistic. This youth loved its country, wanted to see it morally and politically clean, hoped for its economic development, and thought—with reason—that it was Trujillo who blocked morality, liberty, and development of the country. It is also easy to understand why this nationalism took the form of anti-Americanism. It was simply a feeling of frustration. This youth, which had not been able to get rid of Trujillo, thought that Trujillo was in power because of his support by the United States. For them, the United States and Trujillo were partners, both to be blamed for what was happening in the Dominican Republic, and for that reason their hate for Trujillo was naturally converted into feelings of anti-Americanism.

I am not discussing here whether they were right or wrong; I am simply stating the fact. I know that in the United States there are people who supported Trujillo and others who attacked him. But the young Dominicans knew only the former and not the latter, since Trujillo took care to give the greatest publicity possible to any demonstration of support, however small, that was offered directly or indirectly by a U.S. citizen, whether he was a Senator or an ordinary tourist; and on the other hand, he took great pains to prevent even the smallest notice in the Dominican Republic of any attack by an American citizen. Thus, the Dominican youth new only that Trujillo had defenders in the United States, not that he had enemies.

For his part, Trujillo succeeded in creating with the Dominican people an image of unity between society and government that can only be compared with what has been produced in countries with Communist regimes. For more than 30 years in the Dominican Republic nothing happened—nothing could happen—without an express order from Trujillo. In the minds of Dominican youth this image was generalized, and they thought that in the United States also nothing could happen without an order from whoever governed in Washington. Thus, for them, when an American Senator, newspaperman, or businessman expressed his support of Trujillo, that person was talking by order of the President of the United States. To this very day, a large number of Dominicans of the middle class think that everything a U.S. citizen says, his Government is saying too.

The pointer of the political balance, as I said earlier, was in the June 14 movement which was saturated with anti-Americanism. This group included the most fervent youths and even those best qualified technically—but not politically—as well as the more numerous nucleus of middle-class youth; it also constituted the social sector where Communist sermons could have the most effect and from whence could come the resolute leaders that the Communists lacked. Trujillo had tortured, assassinated and made martyrs of hundreds of members of the June 14 movement. To persecute these youths was to send them into the arms of communism, to give strength to the arguments of

the few Communists that had infiltrated the movement. The Communists said that the democracy that I headed received its orders from Washington, the same as had Trujillo, to destroy the nationalistic youths. Little by little, as the days passed, the non-Communist and anti-Communist members of the June 14 movement were gaining ground against the Communists, since they were able to prove to their companions that my democratic government neither persecuted them nor took orders from Washington. In 4 years the democratic but nationalistic sector of the June 14 movement—which was in the overwhelming majority—would have ended the Communist influence and made itself into a firm support of Dominican democracy.

The weakness of the Dominican Communists was also shown by the activity of the Social Christian Party, which presented itself as militantly anti-Communist. It persecuted the Communists everywhere, to the point that they could not show themselves in public. But when the Social Christians realized that the best source of young people in the country was the June 14th Movement, they stopped their street fighting against the Communists and began a campaign against imperialism Norteamericano. When they showed with this battle cry that they were not a pro-U.S. party, they began to attract young adherents who had been members of the June 14th Movement as well as many others who already had a clear idea of what they wanted to be: nationalists and democrats. Thus, the Social Christian leaders came to understand that the key to the Dominican political future lay in assuring the nationalistic youth of a worthy and constructive democracy.

What the Social Christians learned by 1963 would have been understood by other political groups if the Dominican democracy had been given time. But this was not to be. Reactionaries in the Dominican Republic and the United States set themselves ferociously against the Dominican democracy under the slogan that my government was "soft" on the Communists.

This is the point at which to analyze "weakness" and "force," if those two terms signify opposite concepts. There are two ways to face problems, particularly political ones. One is to use intelligence and the other is to use force. According to this theory, intelligence is weak, and the use of intelligence, a sign of weakness.

I think that a subject so complex as political feelings and ideas ought to be treated with intelligence. I think also that force is a concept that expresses different values, as can be seen in the United States or in the Dominican Republic. In the United States, the use of force means the application of the law—without crimes, without torture, without medieval barbarism; in the Dominican Republic, it means quite the contrary: one does not apply the law without instruments of torture, not excluding assassination. When a Dominican policeman says of a person that he is a Communist, he is saying that he, the policeman, has the full right to beat him, to shoot him, or to kill him. And since this policeman does not know how to distinguish between a democrat and a Communist, he is quite apt to beat, shoot and kill a democrat.

It is not easy to change the mentality of the people who become policemen in the Dominican Republic, especially with little time to do it. When the New Englanders burned women as witches, those who did the burning believed absolutely that they were destroying witches. Today, nobody believes that they were witches. But it is still like early Salem in Santo Domingo. When a Dominican policeman is told that he should persecute a young man because he is a Communist, the policeman believes with all his soul that his duty is to kill the youth.

The problem that my democratic government faced was to choose between the use of intelligence and the use of force, while the time passed during which the hotheaded youths and uneducated police learned to distinguish between democracy and communism. And if someone says that in this period the Communists would be able to gain strength and take power, I say and guarantee that they could not do it. Only a dictatorship can give to the Communists the arguments they need for progress in the Dominican Republic; under a democratic regime the democratic conscience would outstrip the Communists.

To return to the concepts of intelligence and force, I think that they apply to communism itself in its fight for the conquest of power. No Communist Party, in no country of the world, has been able to reach power solely because it was strong; it has needed, besides, a leader of exceptional capacity. The Dominican Communists have not had and do not have force, and they have not had and do not have a leader comparable to Lenin, Mao, Tito, or Fidel; and according to my prediction, they are not going to have either the force or the leader in the foreseeable future.

Dominican communism is in its infancy, and began, as did Venezuelan communism, with internal divisions that will require many years to overcome. Only the long dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez was able to create the right atmosphere for the different groups of Communists of the Venezuela of 1945 so that they could come together into a single party, and the lack of a leader of exceptional capacity has, in spite of the power of the party, voided the chance of Venezuelan communism coming to power.

How many Communists did France have? How many Italy? But neither French nor Italian communism ever had leaders capable of carrying it to power. In the Dominican case, there are neither the numbers nor the leadership.

I cannot hope that men like Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, or Jules Dubois will know these things, will think about them, and will act accordingly. But logically I had the right to expect that in Washington there would be someone who would understand the Dominican political scene and the role that the Communists could play in my country. As is evident, I was mistaken. In Washington they know the Dominican problems only as they are told of them by Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, and Jules Dubois.

The lack of adequate knowledge is tantamount to the nullification of the power of intelligence, above all in politics, and this can only lead to sorry results. When intelligence is canceled, its place is occupied by fear. Today there has spread over the countries of America a fear of communism that is leading us all to kill democracy for fear that democracy is the mask of communism.

It seems to me we have reached the point where we consider democracy incapable of resolving the problems of our peoples. And if we have truly arrived at this point, we have nothing to offer humanity. We are denying our faith, we are destroying the columns of the temple that throughout our life has been our shelter.

Are we really doing this? No, I should not say this. It is the others. Because in spite of everything that has happened, I continue to believe that democracy is the dwelling place of human dignity.

NEBRASKA CENTENNIAL, 1967—  
PART II

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, last year at this time I addressed the Senate regarding the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Nebraska statehood. My purpose was to acquaint my colleagues

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with the planned celebrations and to highlight the past 100 years of Nebraska development. Since last June much work has been undertaken by the citizens of Nebraska and the foundation is being laid for a successful and enduring centennial year.

Now I would like to review some of the activities of the people of Nebraska and the enthusiastic response which the many local endeavors have engendered. A grassroots approach is the keystone to the many centennial celebrations being planned across the State and in the many communities. There has been a ground swell of activity on the local level to plan and develop projects which will have a significance not only for the centennial year of 1967, but also for many years to come. There has been no request for funds from the Federal Government to aid in the planning and carrying out of centennial activities, as was the case in several other statehood anniversaries. The principal means of support, financially and morally, are coming from local organizations and private individuals.

Mr. President, on March 1, 1967, Nebraskans will formally commence celebration of their 100th anniversary of statehood. Carved out of the center of the vast Louisiana Purchase, peopled by travelers westward who crossed the Missouri River to settle along the famous overland routes of the Oregon and Mormon Trails, and organized in the immediate post-Civil War period, Nebraska became the Nation's 37th State.

Today a new awareness of the historical background of local areas in the State is being given impetus by the approaching centennial. The local citizen is probing and questioning the long and, sometimes, unknown past. Undoubtedly, out of the preparations and responses from this 100th anniversary, local histories will abound and new knowledge will be gained of the mysteries of unrecorded eons of time. The beneficiaries of this historical searching will not alone be the generation of today but the ones of the future as well. The Lincoln Star editorially put it in this way:

One of the early rewards of Nebraska's centennial planning is not occurring on the State level, but in the communities themselves.

It is a rising interest in history of the area, the sort that goes way back, not the usual kind that repeats the story of how the present town was started. All parts of the world have a history of equal length. The land in Nebraska is the same age as that of ancient Greece. But we have not sufficiently considered our history beyond our own time. We tread on ground made sacred by great struggles of an early and almost unknown people. But most of us don't know it.

The Nebraska town with the lovely name of Weeping Water is a case in point. The town now has an historian. Recently, the poetry and narrative of the Indian legends which gave the area its special significance have been collected and published by the townspeople. The future will benefit.

In other instances, Nebraskans, on the eve of their centennial, are planning celebrations which will both dictate 10 decades of pioneer heritage and initiate programs of lasting value in the coming

years. The centennial tree planting program is a fine illustration. Prairie voyagers of the 19th century on Nebraska's frassy seas found a land barren of trees and, seemingly, a desert of opportunities. Turning to their most precious natural resource—the soil—ingenious pioneers fashioned sod houses until timber could be brought in and seedlings planted.

In keeping with the tradition of these pioneers and with the work of J. Sterling Morton, whose tree planting efforts are recognized each Arbor Day, the centennial tree planting program is encouraging Nebraskans to plant 6 million trees per year through 1967 on lands both public and private. Here again the key is the local efforts of the citizens to dramatize their appreciation for the beauty of nature and enrichen recreational facilities and leave a bountiful legacy of natural beauty for future generations.

This, like most the other centennial programs, is being promoted and performed largely at the local level. Each of the State's 93 counties is forming its centennial committee, either alone or with neighboring counties. Thus, Nebraska's 100th birthday will be a truly grassroots celebration with emphasis on organizations at the city and county levels.

The people of Nebraska have been quite creative and have brought forth a multitude of ideas. Early in 1967 the hard work and achievement of the local towns and counties will be recognized by the naming of a centennial city and a centennial county which have made the greatest contributions in the respective centennial betterment programs. Although all the cities and counties cannot win and be so honored, this is a contest in which no one will lose. All of the projects will enrichen the locale and inspire the people.

The young people in the State have been enthusiastic and interested in the many programs being carried on at the local level. For instance, Otoe County held a county flag design contest in which the result would be the adoption of an official county flag. The winner of the most creative design was a 13-year-old student, Mary Lindell. This is not the only area where student participation and contribution have been significant. In Burt County the students in a local school have designed, written, and published an attractive booklet on the many visiting places in the area, those of historical significance and those of a recreational nature. The contribution of these students has been well received by the citizens of the community and will be an invaluable aid to visitors.

The citizens of Saline County have been ambitious in their efforts to insure a successful centennial. As in other counties across the State, a historical marking program is being pursued. Sites and symbols of local historical significance are being carefully recorded and marked for the benefit of the residents and visitors. The story of the West is complex and contains many historical threads. Through efforts of these local groups the complete and complex historical weave of time will be more understandable and reveal the essential in-

gredients of the broad picture of American history.

In addition, the county is contemplating a centennial scholarship program for students in the county schools. Here the intense interest in education and the means to provide the necessary opportunities for deserving young people are the bases for a program of widespread significance not just for the centennial but for years to come.

Out in Deuel County, the impact of centennial planning has taken another course. The importance of history is being highlighted and efforts are being directed toward the establishment of a county historical society to insure that the past is not lost to the future and that records are preserved. For the modern-day traveler, the citizens of the county are focusing their efforts upon placing and improving rest stops and parks along the Interstate Highway which traverses the country, the State and the Nation. This is a practical and important contribution.

Finally, it would be an oversight of a Senator representing the beef State not to mention the nationwide program to boost Nebraska beef. Across the country the appearance of the Nebraska centennial sirloin has attracted the attention of the connoisseur and the man in the street who enjoys good beef. The centennial sirloin is the finest piece of corn-fed beef that can be bought anywhere; it must meet certain established minimum specifications; and it must be Nebraska beef. Increasingly, the restaurants and fine eating places in Nebraska and around the country are advertising and using the Nebraska centennial sirloin. This is a fine testimony in itself.

Senator CURTIS and I want to extend to our colleagues and the citizens of their States the hospitality and friendliness of Nebraskans. Come to Nebraskaland any time, and particularly mark the calendar for the many activities of Nebraska's centennial year. The warmth and openness of Nebraskans can be found in few other places. The tourist attractions and wealth of history of the Old West abound in Nebraska. Whatever your pleasure or fancy, seeing Nebraska will be immensely profitable and satisfying. In this regard, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article I wrote on this subject for the Omaha World-Herald on May 2, 1965, "Nebraska—Big as All Outdoors."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Omaha World-Herald, May 2, 1965]  
"HOWDY, NEIGHBOR"—NEBRASKA—BIG AS ALL OUTDOORS

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—ROMAN L. HRUSKA was born August 16, 1904, in David City, Nebr. He was educated in Omaha and received a law degree from Creighton University. He practiced law in Omaha for years, then served as chairman of the county board and eventually was elected to the U.S. Senate. A sportsman, he loves the outdoor hunting and fishing of his home State. For this tourist magazine, we asked him to welcome travelers to our State in 1965.)

(By ROMAN L. HRUSKA, U.S. Senator)

Nebraska is a land of diversity and variety. It is diverse in offering to the traveler rolling